The Color Revolutions:
A Study of Democratization in Serbia and Ukraine

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Introduction

At the start of the 2000’s an electoral revolution began in Serbia. Serbian students began organizing a nonviolent revolution to end Slobodan Milosevic’s authoritarian presidency and reform their government. Committed to nonviolent action and prepared for potential repressive responses by Milosevic’s government, revolutionaries across Serbia planned and executed actions designed to undermine Milosevic and challenge his legitimacy.¹ Four years later, a similar revolution began in Ukraine. Using the same discipline to nonviolent direct action and mass mobilization, revolutionaries attempted to expose the fraudulent elections, oust the authoritarian regime, and reform their government.² These revolutions were modeled after similar electoral revolutions which swept through Eastern and Southern Europe, starting in the 1990’s and proceeding throughout the 2000’s.

Serbia and Ukraine, both post-Soviet countries, had long-standing histories with authoritarian regimes, and despite their complete freedom from Soviet rule by the 1990’s, participatory and democratic governments eluded them. Authoritarian rule caused persistent issues with instability in social, political, and economic growth and fostered chronic corruption in both cases.³ In the case of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic gained power in 1989 and, through a series of nationalistic campaigns and suspected fraudulent means, maintained his authoritarian presidency.⁴ Milosevic violated international human rights law, leading Serbia into four separate

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wars and an ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Similarly, the repressive regime in Ukraine, led by Leonid Kuchma and his chosen successor Viktor Yanukovych, held several fraudulent elections to hold the presidency. For Ukraine, Kuchma’s exit from office and subsequent new elections sparked the revolution. Kuchma and the Ukrainian government claimed Yanukovych had the popular vote, despite polling data indicating otherwise. Both Serbian and Ukrainian citizens identified their leaders as limiting democratic freedoms, excluding them from the international community, and, most importantly, threatening their right to vote in free and fair elections.

These revolutions, although years apart, used the same nonviolent tactics, inspired by theorist Gene Sharp’s work, to end authoritarian rule and reform their governments; activists planned mass protests and actions designed to mobilize citizens, and Serbia’s actions heavily influenced the strategies used in Ukraine. Both strategies included exclusively nonviolent demonstrations and mass mobilization to show discontent with their respective governments and ensure that citizens would show up and vote on Election Day. In Serbia, Election Day resulted in an eighty percent turn out from voters. Although the opposition candidate, Kostunica, had won, Milosevic refused to step down. This led to the final protest in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, which ended with a capital take-over and marked the end of Milosevic’s rule. For Ukraine, the first election resulted in a tie and required a run-off vote, but citizens suspected ballot

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7 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 36
8 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 35
manipulation after the broadcasted results did not match those of the exit polls. When revolutionaries staged demonstrations and set up a tent camp in the streets of Kiev, the election results were analyzed by the Supreme Court and Parliament, both of whom found them fraudulent. The final election was held in December, and the revolutionary candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, won the presidency.\(^{10}\)

Both revolutions employed nonviolent tactics to overthrow a repressive regime and introduce new candidates into the political sphere; however, these initial successes did not necessarily lead to long-term democratic success. Analyses of these revolutions have attempted to explain how democratization manifested, but have not always been consistent. It has been identified that Serbia achieved a stable democratic society, and Ukraine did not, but compelling analyses are severely lacking.\(^{11}\) Serbia achieved long-term gains in their government, maintaining citizen participation and free and fair elections even after Kostunica’s presidency, with impressive sustainability and success, even into the present day.\(^{12}\) Ukraine was unable to achieve the same level of success. The revolutionaries campaigned for Viktor Yushchenko, a widely trusted candidate because of his previous experience as Prime Minister, but Yushchenko presidency left much to be desired. Unable to manage the harsh political party divisions and transition the previous regime members out of power, the next election cycle allowed previous regime members to gain power, and the revolutionaries’ hope for sustainable democracy


\(^{11}\) Many factors have been analyzed to identify success or failure between Color Revolutions, but relevant factors have not been conclusive across studies.

dwindled. Although these revolutions began with similar political and social cultures, used similar tactics, and achieved the same short-term goals, Serbia achieved a sustainable democracy, and Ukraine found itself repeating its authoritarian past. Using theories of democratization, this paper will analyze factors that occurred after the nonviolent revolution and subsequent regime change, including economic development, citizen wellness, civil society, and general political change, in hopes of identifying why Serbia flourished and Ukraine fell short.

**Literature Review**

Starting at the end of the 1990’s, a flood of electoral-based revolutions surged through Eastern and Southern Europe, coined as the Color Revolutions. Hoping for democracy, these revolutions adhered to nonviolent action as a means to escape autocratic rule; however, achieving democratic societies proved more difficult than anticipated. With very similar starting conditions, Serbia and Ukraine both attempted an electoral Color Revolution, but with vastly different democratic success and sustainability.

The Serbian Revolution, named the Black or Bulldozer Revolution, attempted to overthrow the oppressive dictator, Slobodan Milosevic. Started in 1998 by the student group, Otpor; the revolutionary objective was to end Milosevic’s presidency but also advocated for “free and fair elections, free university, and free and independent media”. Although began in 1998, Otpor found the majority of its momentum in February of 2000. They planned to bring

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13 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2005): 47
16 Although the case of Serbia and Ukraine are comparable in many respects, differences in international allies and relationships, discussed in Limitations section, may impact the efficacy of this kind of comparison.
about an early presidential election, win the election by organizing large numbers of citizens to vote, and completely reform the political system.\textsuperscript{18} The Serbian Revolutionaries accomplished this through studious attention to nonviolence as a discipline, planning and executing humorous actions at pivotal moments in Milosevic’s rule, and gaining support within citizens and state security forces. All of this culminated in the final protest, of almost one million citizens, on the streets of Belgrade on October 5th, 2000. This last action, where members used bulldozers to disperse blockades and give the revolution its name, resulted in the seizure of the federal parliament building and marked the end of Milosevic’s rule.\textsuperscript{19}

The Ukrainian Revolution, named the Orange Revolution, also attempted a regime change, hoping to oust Leonid Kuchma and his chosen successor Viktor Yanukovych. Many citizens had suspected election fraud for some time, but the election between Yanukovych and revolutionary candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, solidified this fear. Starting November 21st, 2004, nonviolent protests, led by student group Pora, intended to defend the right to free and fair elections, and similar demonstrations spread across the country. Nonviolent action became the discipline of all activists and inspired demonstrations across the country. In the capital, Kiev, activist numbers reached almost one million, and smaller actions continued daily elsewhere in the country. Protests continued day and night, many involving tent cities forming in the streets.

\textsuperscript{18} Max Rennebohm. “Serbians overthrow Milosevic (Bulldozer Revolution), 2000.” \textit{Global Nonviolent Action Database}. Last modified September 8, 2011. \url{https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/serbians-overthrow-milosevic-bulldozer-revolution-2000}

\textsuperscript{19} Max Rennebohm. “Serbians overthrow Milosevic (Bulldozer Revolution), 2000.” \textit{Global Nonviolent Action Database}. Last modified September 8, 2011. \url{https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/serbians-overthrow-milosevic-bulldozer-revolution-2000}
On December 1st, parliament finally declared the election fraudulent; a run-off election was scheduled and monitored carefully, and Yushchenko won the presidency.\footnote{Max Rennebohm. “Ukrainians overthrow dictatorship (Orange Revolution), 2004.” Global Nonviolent Action Database. Last modified September 9, 2011. https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ukrainians-overthrow-dictatorship-orange-revolution-2004}

Both of these revolutions were inspired by the work of Gene Sharp.\footnote{Brian Martin. “Gene Sharp’s Theory of Power.” Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 2 (1989). Sharp’s theory relies on a subject-ruler classification and consent of subjects to rulers; however, critiques of Sharp’s theory argue it does not fully address systems of oppression outside of the subject-ruler, or state-citizen, relationship. For example, patriarchy, capitalism, or technology do require consent of citizens but are not within the subject-ruler dichotomy. These institutions can be integrated into the pillars of support, but they can also act as the role of the state or ruler, which makes identifying their relationship to Sharp’s theory challenging. It is argued that Sharp’s theory, in this way, is too simplistic; however, theories to replace Sharp’s are still undeveloped.} Sharp argued that nonviolent strategies and tactics could be used as a means of electoral reformation. Revolutionaries chose a representative symbol or color, which acted as a calling card and unifying characteristic for the revolutionaries.\footnote{Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action: Part two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action (Manchester, NG: Porter Sargent Publishers, Inc., 2012), 135-136} This inspired Serbia’s name, the Bulldozer or Black Revolution, and Ukraine’s, the Orange Revolution. Sharp’s work went much beyond the naming of a revolution, and, in fact, his pamphlet, From Dictatorship to Democracy, acted as a major influence on the Serbian revolution; shared across activists and integrated into training modules, Sharp’s theory fueled passionate actionists.\footnote{Joshua, Paulson. “Case Study: Serbia, 1996-2000,” in Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts. ed. Gene Sharp (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2012), 15} Later, Serbia’s revolutionary leaders shared the pamphlet and their developed model of revolution with Ukrainian leaders.\footnote{Michael McFaul, “Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution,” International Security 32, no. 2 (2007): 78}

Using mass mobilization and nonviolent strategy, Sharp’s theory chronicles a system for citizens to wage a nonviolent political struggle, which can dismantle even the most ruthless dictator and achieve a stable democracy. This theory assumes that all governments, even authoritarian regimes, rely on consent of their citizens; therefore, if citizens wish to drastically
change their government, they must revoke this consent.\textsuperscript{25} Using strategic and intelligent nonviolent actions, citizens can alter the power structures in place, leaving the government with no power and no one to rule over.\textsuperscript{26} If revolutionaries maintain their commitment to nonviolent action, any governmental response using violence becomes obviously repressive and unjust, convincing citizens, or even regime members, of the regime’s illegitimacy. This process, which Sharp calls political jiu-jitsu, shifts the power relationship in the citizens’ favor and can dramatically impact the revolution’s success.\textsuperscript{27} The manifestation of political defiance or political jiu-jitsu depends on the movement’s goals, but a comprehensive list of almost two-hundred potential methods exists in \textit{The Methods of Nonviolent Action}\textsuperscript{28}, also authored by Sharp.

Sharp argues that application of this theory can effectively foster a rich democracy. Through nonviolent action, citizens become more confident in challenging the regime’s unfair behaviors and more unified in their opinions, and they begin to practice democratic freedoms, including free speech, press, and assembly.\textsuperscript{29} As Sharp sees it, nonviolent action exposes citizens to the benefits of democratic freedoms and creates a better environment for it to thrive once the regime has been overthrown; however, without the guarantee that the new regime will, or perhaps will successfully, implement democratic proceedings, practice may not lead to democratic success.

\textsuperscript{25} Gene Sharp, \textit{From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation} (East Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 2010), 30
\textsuperscript{26} Gene Sharp, \textit{From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation} (East Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 2010), 30
\textsuperscript{29} Gene Sharp, \textit{From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation} (East Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 2010), 37-38
Many theorists insist that democratization occurs in a series of essential steps or follows a clear sequence. Samuel Huntington offered a major analysis of this type, arguing that two factors, free and fair elections and economic development, were required, in that order, for democracy to thrive. Once free and fair elections are achieved, he argues that economic development will follow and drive the transition to democracy. First, education levels, literacy rates, and urbanization increase, which shifts citizen occupation to the middle and working classes. This, then, produces more resources to distribute, making the economy more difficult for the state to control and allowing independent and private sectors to gain more power.\textsuperscript{30} Huntington argues that, in the short term, this increases economic inequality, but in the long term, an equilibrium is achieved. As long as free and fair elections are achieved and the economy equalizes, Huntington argues that democracy has been attained.\textsuperscript{31}

Although Huntington’s sequential theory, relying on economic development as an important aspect of democratization, is still heavily supported, a more recent theory challenges it. Francis Fukuyama has been the strongest voice in examining this new theory of democratization, arguing that economic development can help secure democracy, but it does not work alone. He also states that a sequential theory of democratization ignores the myriad of factors at play.\textsuperscript{32} Instead, he claims that economic development is not a precursor to, but rather concurrent with, larger ideological and cultural changes.\textsuperscript{33} Democracy can only come about as citizens start

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Huntington’s theory does not fully address the negative corollary to increased privatization. He emphasizes the way privatization relinquishes state monopolies, but fails to substantially address the caveat of potentially increased corruption.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Francis Fukuyama. “Is There a Proper Sequence in Democratic Transitions?” \textit{Current History} 110, no. 739 (2011): 308
\item \textsuperscript{33} Francis Fukuyama. “Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon.” \textit{Political Science and Politics} 24, no. 4 (1991): 661
\end{itemize}
doubting their current government systems and mobilize toward a more democratic system. Fukuyama identifies three modern liberal democratic institutions that must be balanced to achieve a successful democracy: the state, rule of law, and democratic accountability. He argues that the state must concentrate and employ power and that the rule of law must reflect public interest and constrain the powerful. Democratic accountability acts as the insurance that the state and rule of law are accomplishing their goals and acting in the interest of the community.\(^3^4\) Essentially, these facets comprise the quality of the government and, especially accountability, rely on the influence of citizens and their ideologies.

Fukuyama’s theory identifies the flaws in sequential, economic-based theories of democratization, but it still overlooks the development of civil society institutions. Initially conceived as “plurality, publicity (free speech and association), privacy, and legality” with an emphasis on equal participation, civil society was modeled after a classical understanding of democracy.\(^3^5\) Two theorists, Cohen and Arato have further developed this society-centered analysis, defining civil society as a social relationship between the economy and state consisting of citizen participation in public and private institutions.\(^3^6\) Their argument, although not sequential, does require that civil society institutions develop before democratization can flourish. They see civil society as institutions specialized in traditions, identities, and culture, with little emphasis on economy or the state.\(^3^7\) Instead of focusing on the state and economy, they emphasize informal and formal citizen groups, cultural and communicative institutions, and

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the individual’s relationship to these. Civil society flourishes when these associations and institutions are created, but, later, they do require the help of the state, more specifically the rule of law, to secure rights which keep them independent of the state. Cohen and Arato argue that a rich civil society fosters democracy once the rule of law protects the existence and development of civil society institutions. In this way, civil society needs protection under the law, similar to how freedom of speech, press, and assembly do. It is necessary to note that these civil societies contain both small-scale interpersonal institutions and large-scale political associations, but always exist independently from the state or economy.

These previous theorists and theories of democratization rely on one major assumption, which is that regime transition leads to democratization. Although a typical assumption, in the case of Serbia and Ukraine, this distinction may indicate some of the differences in their revolutionary outcomes. Regime transition requires both a government turnover, namely a change in executive leadership, and substantial changes in the overall system of government. Democratization, however, is a particular outcome of regime transition where citizens engage in politics through, at least, free and fair elections. Ideally, democratization includes regime transition, democratic accountability, and civil society laws. Based on this definition, true democratization includes aspects of all theories discussed thus far; a substantial change in the

governmental makeup, free and fair elections, democratic accountability, citizen engagement, and civil society.

Using an intersection of these theories will help identify and explain the differences between Serbia and Ukraine’s development of democracy. The leading theory of their differences argues that Serbia accomplished substantial political reform, which included developments in civil society, control of corruption, and media freedom, and that Ukraine attempted the same reform, but its developments were more prone to backsliding into the old politics, corruption, and limited rights present throughout first, Soviet rule, and later, Kuchma’s rule.43 Using the theories above as references, an analysis between Serbia and Ukraine’s democratic achievement will be analyzed.

Analysis

The beginning of participatory democracy manifested from similar events in both Serbia and Ukraine, with surprisingly different results. Using theories of democratization identified above to explain this discrepancy, this section will examine the similarities and differences between Serbia and Ukraine after the revolution in terms of economic development, democratic accountability, civil society, and regime transitions.

Economy

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Samuel Huntington’s theory of democratization uses economic development as a central pillar of democratic transition, indicating that without substantial economic development, democracy cannot fully develop. Using his definition of economic development, increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), education levels, and literacy rates will be compared for Serbia and Ukraine. GDP will measure general economic development, and education and literacy rates will act as measures of the increasing middle class. The data found in this section challenges Huntington’s theory, suggesting that economic development alone could not predict the differences in democratization across these two countries. For both countries, trends from the start of the revolutions to at least ten years after the revolution will be used.

National GDP will be used as the main measure of economic development. In Serbia, there was a $32.92 billion USD increase in GDP from 2000 to 2010. Additionally, their annual growth in GDP spiked after 2000, and they sustained stable growth in subsequent years. Both

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44 Samuel P. Huntington. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3. (1993). Best known for his writing, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Huntington argues that in the post-Cold War era, conflict will no longer be economic or ideologically-motivated, but instead will be driven by cultural differences. Although not the crux of his democratization argument, “Clash of Civilizations” does impact the way Huntington defines the capacity or willingness of a country to democratize. He argues that democratization is a Western ideology that if given adequate conditions, can develop in non-Western societies but with many unique challenges. Since the focus here is on Ukraine and Serbia, both part of the European community, “The Clash of Civilizations?” argument will be treated as if it stands on its own; however, because of Ukraine’s current relationship to Russia, it is possible that Huntington’s theory could inform that relationship independently.

45 For Serbia, some data was unavailable for the 1990’s. In these cases, only the data available will be used, but it is possible this will impact differences seen between Serbia and Ukraine.

46 GDP offers a quick summary of how well an economy is doing. Because it is comparable across countries and gives a broad view of the economy, its useful in comparing economic growth. Although by no means an exhaustive measure of the economy, it is sufficient for this analysis.


of these measures suggest sufficient economic growth in the years after the revolution. In Ukraine, there was a $68.62 billion USD increase in GDP between 2004 and 2014, but their annual growth in GDP slowly decreased, indicating that their economy was still growing but at a lower rate. Based on the GDP data, both Serbia and Ukraine had stable, growing economies in the ten years after their revolutions. According to Huntington’s theory, however, Serbia should have had this growth, and Ukraine should not. Huntington argues that as the economy grows, the capabilities of the state is better, and the state can better provide for citizens; however, with increased capabilities of the state, there is also an increased capacity for repression and corruption. Because of this, it seems that economy is an insufficient measure, at least alone, of democratization in this case.

In Huntington’s theory, the second facet to economic development is the increasing middle class. He defines this in terms of increased education and literacy rates, which he argues lead to citizen organizing and unionizing. In both Serbia and Ukraine, there were steady increases in tertiary education enrollment, but Ukraine’s remained at least 20% above Serbia’s throughout the 2000’s. Huntington’s theory assumes that increased education levels would be

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49 There was growth from the time of the revolution to 10 years after, but because there is no data from the 1990’s, it is unclear what the economy looked like previous to the revolution. The economic growth seen, then, may be a result of the revolution or an independent factor.
52 Citizen organizations will be discussed further within Civil Society, but both countries, just a result of the revolutions beginning, had increases in citizen organizing.
53 “Gross Enrollment Ratio,” United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Last accessed March 16, 2018, http://uis.unesco.org/en/glossary-term/gross-enrolment-ratio. This measure is the gross enrollment, which includes, “the number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education. For the tertiary level, the population used is the 5-year age group starting from the official secondary school graduation age.”
present only as democratization is successful, but based on these trends, increased education levels appear to have played a nominal role in successful democratization. In terms of adult literacy rates, Serbia and Ukraine both exceeded 98% in 2016. Because both countries had such high rates of literate adults, this factor also could not have changed enough to explain the differences between Serbia and Ukraine.

Because of this data, it seems unlikely that Huntington’s theory offers a sufficient explanation for how a stable democracy developed in Serbia but not in Ukraine. Differences in economic development does not follow the pattern expected; however, the growing economies in both Serbia and Ukraine had the potential to foster increased corruption. Although this was not seen in Serbia after the revolution, Ukrainian privatization allowed ruling elites to maintain control of many industries, avoid paying taxes, and bribe necessary officials. The economic growth in Ukraine may have led to increased economic corruption and made their democratic development more challenging instead of easier.

Democratic Accountability

This section will focus on citizen’s access to resources and their quality of life as a result. This will help address the issue of democratic accountability, namely if the Serbian and Ukrainian governments are providing sufficiently for their citizens. Based on Fukuyama’s

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57 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 39
58 Steve Inskeep, Francis Fukuyama On Why Liberal Democracy Is In Trouble, Podcast, (April 4, 2017; Morning Edition; National Public Radio), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/04/522554630/francis-fukuyama-on-why-liberal-democracy-is-in-trouble. Francis Fukuyama, best known for his relationship to the Neoconservative and Postmodern movements, dedicated his research, most notably in his book The End of History, to the idea that through globalization, liberal democracy would become an international standard; however, more recently, Fukuyama has identified how globalization has affected countries unequally, and he has redefined the liberal democracy he previously idealized; (cont. next page)
theory of democratization, Serbia should be providing better resources for its citizens than Ukraine. To measure democratic accountability, this section will examine general measures of citizen wellness\textsuperscript{59}, citizen access to resources, the state’s success in protecting citizens, and the mobility of information and communication.

As measures of population wellness, life expectancy and infant mortality will be used. In Serbia, life expectancy at birth increased slightly in the years after the revolution, from 72 years old in 2000 to 74 in 2010.\textsuperscript{60} Ukraine had a similar increase across these years, from 68 years old to 70.\textsuperscript{61} Both countries had minor increases, but neither reached the average of 76.8 years old in Europe.\textsuperscript{62} Still, there is no large difference between the data for Serbia or Ukraine.\textsuperscript{63} Infant mortality\textsuperscript{64} for Serbia decreased from 13 to 8 deaths per 1,000 live births between 2000 and 2010.\textsuperscript{65} Ukraine saw a smaller decrease from 18 to 12 deaths per 1,000 live births across these 10

\textsuperscript{59} “About the EU- Countries,” European Union, Last accessed March 16, 2018, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en#joining_the_eu. Because both countries are in Europe, comparing this data to other European countries is more apt than using global standards. Additionally, in recent years, Serbia has been working towards a stronger European relationship, especially in terms of EU accession. Ukraine has not made the same steps, but the EU has still shown some interest in building that relationship.


\textsuperscript{63} Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. “Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth.”\textit{Journal of Political Economy} 115, no. 6 (2007). Because during this same period, both Serbia and Ukraine had growing economies, it is possible that life expectancy and the economic growth grew in tandem or as a result of the other; however, research is still developing on the ways this relationship would impact democratization, if at all.

\textsuperscript{64} Infant Mortality includes deaths of children under the age of 5, per every 1,000 live births.

According to the World Health Organization, the goal is for all countries to have less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births; however, the average for Europe lies at 8 per 1,000 live births. Serbia lies right at this average, but Ukraine lies just above, even so, both countries are trending towards even lower rates. Between infant mortality and life expectancy, there are not large enough differences between Serbia and Ukraine, with respect to Europe as a whole, to explain their differences in democratization.

In terms of access to resources, the percent of citizens living below the poverty line will be used. In Serbia, the percent of citizens below the poverty line increased from 24.5% to 25.5% from 2010 to 2016. Ukraine, however, saw a massive decrease from 83.3% in 2000 to 8.6% in 2016. Ukraine performed better than Serbia in decreasing poverty levels, which challenges Fukuyama’s theory that democratization results from democratic accountability and access to resources and indicates the resources access may not be a major aspect in democratization.

69 “Metadata-Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines”, World Bank, Last accessed March 16, 2018, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Metadata/MetadataWidget.aspx?Name=Poverty%20headcount%20ratio%20at%20national%20poverty%20lines%20(%20of%20population)&Code=SI.POV.NAHC&Type=S&ReqType=Metadata&ddlSelectedValue=IND&ReportID=62602&ReportType=Table. This measure is the “percentage of the population living below the national poverty lines”. The poverty lines are different in each country; however, differences in poverty level are not pertinent to this analysis, and instead the percent of citizens below the national poverty line is used.
70 Data from before 2010 was unavailable. Because of this, it is not possible to determine any differences from the before or during the revolution, and instead the focus is on the current ratio.
The state’s capacity to protect its citizens is another important aspect in developing democratic accountability. To measure state protection, the homicide rate will be used. In 2014, Serbia had a homicide rate of 1.3 per 100,000 people. In Ukraine, the rate is 4.4 deaths per 100,000 people, but it had substantially decreased in the time since the revolution. Serbia’s lower homicide rate indicates a better state capacity to protect its citizens, which makes up a major component of democratic accountability. Ukraine’s higher rate, although decreased from the time of the revolution, shows a lower capacity of citizen protection. In post-Soviet countries, fair access to information was severely lacking for many years. Because of this, access to information acts as a huge measure for how democratization has developed. In 2014, 65.3% of the Serbian population had consistent access to the internet. In Ukraine, only 49.3% of the population had consistent access to the internet. This indicates another discrepancy in resources allocation. Given that Ukraine’s economy is on par with economic developments in Serbia, it is surprising that internet access is limited. This discrepancy supports the analysis that Ukraine’s government is prone to falling back into the control of information present during Soviet rule and Kuchma’s government.

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73 This figure is the number of homicides per 10,000 people.
76 Sam Ellis, Why Ukraine is Trapped in Endless Conflict, Online, February 8, 2018; VOX; Video. https://www.vox.com/2018/2/8/16992194/ukraine-russia-conflict-putin-eu, Because of a growing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, there may be a capacity issue for the Ukrainian government to provide adequate protection to citizens, especially those in the conflict zone. Serbia, however, has no active conflict and may be at an advantage for citizen protection. Because of this difference, it is possible that the conflict with Russia is impacting Ukraine’s ability to provide protection for citizens.
These measures of democratic accountability have shown more differences in Serbia and Ukraine’s development in the years since the revolutions than economic measures did. This is due to differences in the state, but also may be due to the civil society institutions supporting developments in Serbia and not in Ukraine. Not only does the state need to provide for its citizens, it also needs to be held accountable, which can be best supported through effective civil society.

Civil Society

Civil Society, as seen in Cohen and Arato’s theory\(^{80}\), can hugely impact the development of democratic institutions and lead to positive gains in democratic accountability. This section will identify civil society institutions, both cultural and political, created during each revolution and maintained after.

In the cases of both Serbia and Ukraine, youth-lead civil society organizations catalyzed the revolutions. Students had less to lose than their adult counterpart, responsible for their jobs and families. With the remnants of Soviet rule still on their minds and the increasingly authoritarian rule proliferating the government, students longed for integration into both domestic and international political communities.\(^{81}\) In both Serbia and Ukraine, growth of civil

\(^{80}\) Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, MA and London, England: The MIT Press, 1997), 387. Cohen and Arato’s theory of democratization attempts to integrate civil society into contemporary political theory, especially in distinguishing civil society from the power-holding economic and political institutions. In doing this, Cohen and Arato heavily favor Habermas’ frameworks. Habermas argues that civil society develops when the state has a multi-party system and civil society institutions are distinct from economic and political ones; however, economic transitions drive a capacity for civil society to develop through the power it gives citizens to challenge authority. Because of this, Cohen and Arato’s theory is not fully distinct from economic analyses, as seen in Huntington’s, but instead acknowledges the relevance of economic transitions and yet emphasizes the citizen participation.

society drove their ability to organize widespread movements. Using these organizations as the means for nonviolent revolutions, Serbia and Ukraine’s youth fought for democracy.

Resistance groups

The Bulldozer Revolution was built by student group Otpor, meaning Resistance. This organization, unaffiliated with a candidate, focused on mobilizing citizens. Unable to find funding domestically, and instead funded heavily by international parties, Otpor became the main organizers for the revolution throughout Serbia but did not work alone.\(^{82}\) With help from Serbian NGO, the Center for Civic Initiatives, over 5,500 copies of Gene Sharp’s pamphlet, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, were translated and published in September of 1999.\(^{83}\) This pamphlet bolstered Otpor’s work and sparked new organizations and involvement across the country. For the last months of the revolution, Otpor and eighteen other organizations banded together to create the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), which collectively supported Kostunica as the new president of Serbia.\(^{84}\) All committed to nonviolent resistance and supporting Kostunica, these groups worked tirelessly to ensure the end of Milosevic’s rule. DOS members and supporters went on to gain a two-thirds majority in parliament\(^ {85}\) and to win local elections across the country.\(^ {86}\) Because of Otpor and the DOS’ success, a group main organizers started the Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), which later helped with trainings and strategies in many revolutions, including some organizations involved in the


Orange Revolution. CANVAS acts as a nonprofit and Non-Governmental Organization which provides workshops, trainings, and strategic discussions about nonviolent resistance, focused in education about nonviolent struggle as a tactic for change.87

The Orange Revolution, on the other hand, did not have a central organization leading all movements, but all groups committed to nonviolent action and their overall goals for free and fair elections. Similarly to the Serbian revolution, students were a major resources for planning and executing actions, and most activists were under the age of thirty.88 Student group, Pora, meaning It’s Time, split into two groups, Black Pora and Yellow Pora.89 Although both using the name Pora, they functioned independently for most of the revolution. Black Pora, heavily influenced by Otpor, was led by politically-involved Ukrainian students, all of whom were trained in nonviolent resistance and campaign organization. Largely funded by domestic sources and politically unaligned, Black Pora was extraordinarily active and successful, but because of its influence from Otpor and Western traditions, not all Ukrainians supported their goals.90 Yellow Pora developed out of older activists looking to use what they called, Ukrainian tactics; still drawing inspiration from Otpor and Sharp, they worked to pioneer tactics of their own.91 Yellow Pora was a part of the Freedom of Choice coalition, which included over 300 civil society and election monitoring organizations. Although functioned on its own, Yellow Pora was

funded by and worked alongside this coalition.\footnote{Taras Kuzio, “Civil society, youth, and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions,” \textit{Communist and Post-Communist Studies} 38, (2006): 377} Outside of the Pora factions, Our Ukraine started actions of their own, acting primarily as Yushchenko's campaign movement; in fact, a major leader of Our Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko, went on to serve as Yushchenko's Prime Minister.\footnote{“Chronology (Ukraine).” Europa World Online, Last Accessed March 16, 2018, \url{http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.depaul.edu/entry/ua.chron} } Our Ukraine became the face of the Orange Revolution in many ways; the symbol of the revolution, the color orange, was initially Yushchenko's campaign color, and many speakers at rallies, especially for the tent cities in Kyiv, were led by Our Ukraine activists.\footnote{Taras Kuzio, “Civil society, youth, and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions,” \textit{Communist and Post-Communist Studies} 38, (2006): 370.}

Although Our Ukraine stood firmly behind Yushenko, no collectives or coalitions were formed to the same capacity seen in Serbia. Instead, the Ukrainian organizations remained politically divided, only sure of their desire for free and fair elections.

\textit{Revolutionary Media}

Media played a dynamic role in both the Bulldozer and Orange Revolutions. Because under the Authoritarian regimes, media access was limited and edited by the state, independent news organizations acted as the only way to publicize the revolutions, but these institutions were not without their oppositions.

In Serbia, dozens of independent radio and television stations helped spread revolutionary news. Radio b-92, Studio-B, and Radio Index, the most prominent independent radio stations, fought tirelessly to present equal and balanced news. Despite several state-led raids and canceled broadcasts, they threatened strikes and performed nonviolent takeovers to maintain the integrity
and fight for equality in the media. Inspired by the independent media’s integrity, several of the state-run new stations began nonviolent protests against the unequal and inaccurate news broadcasts about the revolution. In the city of Novi Sad, over 150 state news workers signed a petition asking for the resignation of the chief editor, and six employees were fired for refusing to broadcast state news until their petition was recognized. In another city, Kragujevac, workers halted all broadcastings to protest the biased state news. Actions on behalf of the news outlet’s workers continued throughout the movement in attempts to equally and truthfully publicize information about the revolution. Simultaneously with the parliament building takeover, activists planned a takeover of the Milosevic’s strongest news source, Radio Television Serbia. In this takeover, activists ended Milosevic’s propaganda and replaced the broadcasts with slides reading, “This is the new Radio Television Serbia...” Because the widespread work of Serbian resistance groups, like Otpor and the DOS coalition, news workers began to see how little accurate and fair information was shared about the revolution. The support and attempts to maintain fair news coverage hugely impacted the success of the revolution, maintaining visibility for the movement, despite state attempts to shut the revolution out of the media.

During the Orange Revolution, media played a nominal role in mobilizing citizens, notably because most revolutionary media forms were concentrated in urban areas. Because of this, media was unable to mobilize citizens on the same scale seen in Serbia. Television and radio played small roles in mobilizing urban or rural citizens, but the growing use of the internet

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in urban areas was pivotal. Ukraine’s television and radio were heavily driven by the state, and fewer independent news stations were accessible; however, as the revolutionary members grew, individual journalists began to reject the government censorship and control, launching their own strikes and protests.\textsuperscript{98} Although these actions released some government control of media, revolutionaries did not manage full takeovers of any stations. Channel 5, the only independent, opposition-led media station, was only available as a cable station and reached a mere 3% of citizens across the country, most of whom lived urban areas.\textsuperscript{99} Because of the concentrated nature of Channel 5, the internet acted as the main mode of communication among protesters, reaching more citizens than television could.\textsuperscript{100} Not only could citizens access much more information than before with the internet, it also offered easy communication through chat rooms, email, and blogs.\textsuperscript{101} Although domestic access to the internet was still rather low, it allowed revolutionaries to share information worldwide, and, as a result, activists shared information of fraud and corruption, produce films and documentaries, and generally involve the international community to the Ukrainian fight for democracy. In this way, the Orange Revolution became the first internet revolution.\textsuperscript{102}

Ukrainian activists had access to such a wealth of information sharing, but the relatively low engagement rate domestically made it less successful than the use of media in the Serbian revolution. Serbian revolutionaries chose media outlets which all Serbian citizens had access to, guaranteeing that the revolutionary message was received across the country; however, Ukraine,

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\textsuperscript{98} Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 84, no. 2 (2005): 44
\textsuperscript{99} Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 84, no. 2 (2005): 44
\textsuperscript{100} Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 84, no. 2 (2005): 43
\end{flushleft}
largely unable to combat the government control of media, focused on sharing among the global community and lacked the same domestic, especially rural, support that Serbia attained.

**Electoral Monitors**

In both Serbia and Ukraine, their entire revolution hinged on monitoring fraudulent elections. All civil society organizations in both countries advocated for government and regime change, a major component of which was ensuring free and fair elections; however, the extent of election monitoring organizations varied.

In Serbia, most of the election monitoring came from domestic organizations, specifically from the Federal Election Commission. This government-controlled organization initially gave Kostunica the victory but claimed a second election would be necessary to confirm; however, this announcement was made without all Commission members at the meeting, specifically without any revolution-affiliated members. Because of this, activists claimed fraud and planned demonstrations across the country, with the final action resulting in the parliamentary takeover on October 5th. Although third-party and international election monitoring was not a tactic of revolutionaries, the unjust monitoring of the Commission fueled citizen engagement and reignited their passion for justice.

Ukraine, on the other hand, had dozens of both domestic and international election monitoring organizations help protect against fraud. Domestically, organizations like Zanyu, worked to train election monitors; while others, like the Committee of Voters, organized

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domestic and international monitors and developed the plans for monitoring. Several international organizations aided in monitoring, including the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), which provided over 700 new monitors for the second and third voting rounds and worked to maintain unbiased monitors. Many of the resistance group members, including both branches of Pora, also engaged as election monitoring, and the Freedom of Choice coalition brought together civil society and election monitoring. With the massive focus on election monitoring, Yushchenko was granted presidency with a large margin of confidence and well documented voter fraud on behalf of his opponent, Yanukovych. In this way, Ukraine’s election results were much better documented than its Serbian counterpart.

Ukraine was able to better measure the actual success of the elections, which resulted in a legitimate and documented transfer of power, also under the watch of European and United States representatives. Serbia, with the initial refusal of Milosevic to step down, resorted to large-scale demonstrations to pressure Milosevic’s resignation. Serbian citizens, with little international involvement, could not fairly train or execute election monitoring on the scale seen in Ukraine and instead relied on citizen mobilization. Each tactic resulted in the transfer of power, but the prevalence of election monitoring organizations in Ukraine resulted in a faster and more effective transfer of power.

Other Civil Society

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108 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2005): 44
Key differences in the development and use of resistance groups and revolutionary media in Serbia and Ukraine created differences in tactics, but both societies developed functioning and effective groups to achieve their goals; however, another important facet of building successful civil society relies on cultural and society-centered institutions.\textsuperscript{109} This section will highlight institutions built on religious principles, worker unions, and general citizen participation in each revolution.

After Milosevic refused to concede, the Serbian revolution spread across the country, engaging citizens previously unaware of the cause. Rural coal workers, many protected by unions, were particularly important actors in pressuring the country; producing more than half of Serbia’s electricity, over 7,000 workers went on strike and declared that they would not return to work until Kostunica was given the presidency. The pressure on Milosevic to step down was at its highest.\textsuperscript{110} Members of the Serbian Society of Composers, Alliance of Composers Organization, and artists across the country halted all artistic work until Milosevic resigned.\textsuperscript{111} Mayors of various cities called for city-wide strikes and tent cities in town squares.\textsuperscript{112} Patriarch Pavle, of the Serbian Orthodox Church, called on the police and army to protect the interests of the people and personally asked Milosevic to resign.\textsuperscript{113} Across the country, Serbian citizens joined in supporting the revolution. Nonviolent actions and demonstrations saturated urban and rural cities, and by the end of Milosevic’s rule all state media and armed forces had also joined

the revolution.\textsuperscript{114} By the culmination of the Bulldozer Revolution, organizations and civil society
groups had banded together for the same cause, Milosevic’s resignation and Kostunica’s victory.
Nonviolent action and hopes of democracy proliferated society.

In Ukraine, involving citizens currently unaffiliated with the revolution proved much
more challenging. Most actions and demonstrations were prepared by the formal resistance
groups, largely through the use of the internet. As the revolution developed, however, women
took their spot in the revolution. During the Orange Revolution, women were asked to take a
loving and nurturing role, in an attempt to protect them from potential danger.\textsuperscript{115} Typical gender
roles permeated Ukrainian society, but women took this turbulent moment to challenge these
stereotypes. Women’s Squads formed, attempting to give a voice to women protesters and
challenge their role as the “mothers of the nation”; they began a feminist revolution, calling
Yanukovych the physical embodiment of patriarchy, and using the election to protect their
rights.\textsuperscript{116} By challenging typical gender roles, women granted themselves the right to participate
tangibly in the revolution, especially through their ability to mobilize citizens outside urban,
politically charged-youths. Using values of equality and human rights, Women’s Squads
provided a template for successful civic identity based in equality for everyone.\textsuperscript{117} Ukrainian
women found their role unsatisfactory in the revolution and fought to find their voice, but as the
revolution came and went, their ability to maintain momentum dwindled. Initial successes and

\textsuperscript{114} Joshua Paulson. “Case Study: Serbia, 1996-2000,” in Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of
\textsuperscript{115} Taras Kuzio, “Civil society, youth, and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions,” Communist and
\textsuperscript{116} Sarah D. Phillips, “The Women’s Squad in Ukraine’s Protests: Feminism, Nationalism, and Militarism on the
\textsuperscript{117} Sarah D. Phillips, “The Women’s Squad in Ukraine’s Protests: Feminism, Nationalism, and Militarism on the
flourishing civil society receded as Yushchenko’s presidency did not bring as much change as expected.

Serbian citizens became fully integrated into the revolution and united in their goals, but Ukrainian citizens were still fragmented, somewhat unsure of what the revolution should achieve. This is most apparent in the development of additional civil society groups. Ukrainian women fostered a beautiful and strong secondary revolution, but their slightly different goals to other resistance groups made it more difficult to create lasting civil society.

Regime Transition

Serbia’s civil society allowed citizen engagement in politics to a degree much higher than that of Ukraine; however, this was not exclusively a result of effective civil society. This occurred as a result of successful regime transition and democratization which then allowed civil society to flourish.

The Serbian election resulted in a full government turnover, as Kostunica took over for Milosevic, and the entire system was effectively changed. Milosevic’s regime quickly tendered their resignations, and revolutionary candidates won a two-thirds majority in the parliament. The European Union helped lift sanctions and provided financial help for the reconstruction of the government. Not only was the revolution successful in ending Milosevic’s rule, they worked immediately to replace as much of the remaining regime as possible. Because of this, citizens engaged fully in both the new political and social institutions.

After the Ukrainian election, Yushchenko took over as president, and hired Yulia Tymoshenko as his Prime Minister, but outside of this, members of Kuchma’s regime remained.

Changes to the constitution between the first voting round in 2004 and the last in 2005 also restricted the President’s power, and made Yushchenko's ability to replace remaining Kuchma regime members difficult. Even so, a fair number of Kuchma’s regime were transitioned out of the government, with highly qualified politicians, but the new members came from a wide-range of political ideologies. Because of this, Yushchenko's government became fragmented across ideological divides and building alliances across these groups proved challenging. Despite the challenging domestic relationships, Yushchenko managed to govern successfully until 2010 but not to the degree citizens desired, and in 2010, he lost the election to previous election candidate, Yanukovych.

Even with successful steps towards removing the previous regime’s members, the Serbian government managed a more successful transition than its Ukrainian counterpart. Yushchenko made large changes, but did not gain ideological consistency. The ideological differences made managing corruption and development more challenging than in Serbia.

**Discussion**

In the comparison of Serbia and Ukraine, differences in economic growth seem nominal, but differences in democratic accountability and the development of civil society are much larger. If democratic accountability and civil society lead to more stable and functional democracies, this would help explain Serbia’s democratic achievement and Ukraine’s gradual transition back into authoritarian regimes. Ukraine and Serbia did not differ largely in all measures of democratic accountability, but the differences observed correlate with the differences in the development of democratization.

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119 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” *Foreign Affairs 84*, no. 2 (2005): 46
120 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” *Foreign Affairs 84*, no. 2 (2005): 47
Ukraine and Serbia both developed new civil society organizations through their revolutions, but the largest difference was in the nature and location of these organizations. The Ukrainian revolution focused on importing electoral organizations and asking the international community for help. Relying on international organizations, however, meant that after the election results were solidified, these organizations had no further business in Ukraine, and Ukraine was left with little to none domestic civil society organizations after the regime changed. Even as more civil society grew, especially in the case of Women’s Squads, the revolution itself was pushed most by the capacity of electoral organizations, rather than just by citizens. Citizen groups were necessary in mobilizing organizations to aid in electoral monitoring and citizens to join in demonstrations. Each resistance group in the Orange Revolution wanted to end authoritarian regimes and used nonviolent means to support that, but all groups did not stand behind one candidate or present a united front for government reformation. Because of this, electoral monitoring played a larger role in the actual regime transition than revolutionaries, and resistance groups did not have as substantial of a voice in actual government reform once Yushchenko was elected.

Serbia, on the other hand, relied heavily on citizens coming together, and these social, rather than political, organizations became more and more relevant to their blossoming society. The support garnered from groups across the country, from every walk of life, aided in creating a united Serbia, which could maintain their political change. Because so many Serbian citizens joined the revolution, and later elected members of the revolution into parliament and local government, the Serbian citizens ensured they would be fairly represented in their new government, rather than just electing one actor they hoped could represent them. In this way, the
Ukrainian reliance on electoral and political organizations distracted from successful development of domestic civil society, and the civil society which did develop, lost political momentum after the revolution. Instead, only free and fair elections were guaranteed, but civil society was not protected or supported long-term, as it was in Serbia.

Rich civil society helped the initial transitions of power in both cases; however, Serbian civil society continued to develop after the regime change and was inextricable from the political sphere. Based on the theories of democratization as well as the data examined, the differences in civil society most likely explain the differences in democratic development, but the differences in political transition, discussed further in the limitations section, also plays a relevant role in the differences observed. Because of the largely inconclusive results from analyzing economic growth, democratic accountability, and civil society, it is difficult to draw a larger conclusion about what caused the differences between democratization in both Serbia and Ukraine. Civil society played the largest role in sustaining the revolutions, but external factors may have played an even larger role.

Limitations

Although Serbia and Ukraine adhered to similar tactics of nonviolence such as their focus on ridicule, their use of tent cities, and the involvement of youth, stable democratic proceedings were not achieved in both. Differences in development and maintenance of civil society appeared to be the largest difference in the two cases; however, the role of international relationships, and especially the impact of Russia on these countries may be an indication of the difficulties in comparing these two countries.
One major difference between post-revolution Serbia and Ukraine is the involvement of Russia. Many analyses identify the historical similarities between post-Soviet countries but the modern relationships are largely overlooked. After Soviet rule ended in Serbia, almost all Russian involvement ended; however, in Ukraine, the end of Soviet rule did not mark the end of Russia’s interests there. During the Orange Revolution, President Putin heavily favored Yanukovych, and after Yushchenko's victory, relations with Russia became stressed. By the 2008 elections, Yushchenko was running for reelection against Yanukovych, and Russian involvement was clear throughout; Putin heavily praised Yanukovych and spent several hundred million dollars supporting the campaign. Yushchenko was poisoned not long before the end of the election, and government-controlled media ignored potential foul-play, despite previous allegations against Russian operatives poisoning opposition candidates and sufficient evidence that foul play was possible. After Yanukovych's election, Ukrainian relations with Russia strengthened, but another revolution in 2014 ended Yanukovych's rule and plans to work more closely with Russia ended. As a result, Russian intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine began in 2014, starting a conflict with no end in sight. Despite ceasefires in 2015, the conflict has only worsened. The details of Russia’s involvement remain largely unclear, wherein Putin simultaneously claims no Russian troops are present and that servicemen consistently support Crimean defense groups. Because of the more recent developments in Ukraine, including the

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121 “Regional Relations (Ukraine).” Europa World online, Last accessed March 18, 2018, http://www.europaworld.com.ezproxy.depaul.edu/entry/ua.is.12647728641
122 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 49
123 Adrian Karatnycky. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005): 37
125 Roy Allison. “Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules.” International Affairs 90, no. 6 (2014): 1257
2014 revolution and the Russian-Crimean conflict, Ukraine’s social, political, and economic landscape differs immensely from that of Serbia. The motivation and commitment for Russia to maintain power in Ukraine goes much beyond the scope of this analysis but is a massive difference in how the Serbian and Ukrainian revolutions manifested.\(^{126}\)

Another difference, discussed slightly in this analysis was the involvement of international actors both before and after the revolutions. Serbia maintained tight domestic support for its revolution, and only developed international relations as its domestic affairs were sorted out, waiting even to begin application and integration with the European Union until 2003. Since, it has steadily worked to meet all standards and requirements and is currently working to integrate EU legislation into national law. Formal negotiations started in 2014.\(^{127}\) Serbian revolutionaries used tools from the United States, especially through nonviolence trainings, but developed their own organizations for that going forward. During the revolution, Ukraine had strong ties with international organizations, both based in the United States and throughout Europe. Initially this aided in the success of the revolution, but as Russian propaganda circulated, claims that these organizations violated Ukraine’s sovereignty permeated news cycles.\(^{128}\) Distrust of the same international organizations that once helped foster democracy deterred further international cooperation. Ukraine’s government officials and citizens became weary of international help, rejecting NATO accession and further relations with the European Union.\(^{129}\)

\(^{126}\) Roy Allison. “Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules.” *International Affairs* 90, no. 6 (2014). Further discussion on this relationship is much beyond this analysis, but Allison offers a more in-depth analysis, especially in terms of the relationship of Ukraine and Crimea. Allison’s research dives deeper into the developing conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s intervention.


\(^{128}\) Roy Allison. “Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules.” *International Affairs* 90, no. 6 (2014): 1261

\(^{129}\) Roy Allison. “Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules.” *International Affairs* 90, no. 6 (2014): 1268
Additional differences in political and economic corruption helped Serbia transition and endangered Ukraine’s transition. Economic growth maintained economic corruption seen throughout Ukraine’s history, and attempts at increasing political openness were thwarted by the fractured government. In this way, structural changes under which revolution and regime transition occurred should be further examined. Although both of these revolutions produced popular mobilization through nonviolent means, producing sustained democracy appears to be reliant on supportive domestic, and even international, conditions.

A New Theory of Democratization?

Theories of democratization used in this analysis inadequately addressed a larger issue in sustainable democracy, an issue of international actors. In typical analyses, democracy promotion emerges from Western influences and includes expectations of free and fair elections and a capitalistic economy. Because of this, bilateral international relationships, that is to say the relationship between the democratizing country and Western actors, is considered, but the fullness of multilateral international relations is disregarded.

In the case of Serbia and Ukraine, bilateral analyses pervade; however, because of their relationships to neighboring countries and their post-Soviet status, several other international interrelations should be further examined.
actors had a stake in democratization. Ukraine’s political landscape is shaped by its relationship to the European Union, United States, Russia, and Crimea\(^{135}\), and this same conception can be formulated for Serbia, examining its relationship to the European Union, United States, and its neighboring Balkan countries, including former Yugoslavia. These relationships impact the political and social landscape of these countries, especially in terms of historical contexts, but also contemporarily, as seen above, and have the potential to completely change the course of democratization. Rather than focusing just on the relationship of external actors on the democratizing country, many of the differences between Serbia and Ukraine were dependent on the relationship of international actors to one another. In this way, the relationship of Ukraine to Russia and the European Union is just as relevant as the relationship of Russia to the European Union in impacting Ukraine’s democratic development. Countries rarely democratize without external aid, resources, or organizations, but political theory, as it stands now, does not address these larger international relationships, especially as a function across major actors; however, the relationship of each actor to its respective counterparts is inextricable from one another.

Moving forward, theories of democratization must include multilateral international relationships as main factors, especially as the international community becomes more connected both through international law and through increased information-sharing. Although these larger relationships have varying levels of their impact on democratization, ignoring their influence altogether offers an inadequate analysis and overlooks the impact external relationships have on democratization.

\(^{135}\) Vsevolod Samokhvalov. “Ukraine between Russia and the European Union: Triangle Revisited.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 67, no. 9 (2015). Samokhvalov begins to explore this particular multilateral relationship in terms of contemporary events; however, he does not move assert political theory and instead analyzes just the case of Ukraine.
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